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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
St. George Tucker (1752-1827) was a distinguished law professor,
legal scholar, and judge. He was also an unsuccessful social
reformer: a critic of slavery who sought to make emancipation
acceptable to slaveholding Virginia. As a legal scholar, Tucker
published an edition of William Blackstone's Commentaries that
revised the Commentaries for use by Americans.' Compared to
Blackstone, Tucker embraced a more functional and protective view
of freedom of speech and press, one better designed for a govern-
ment where "the people" are the ultimate authority.2 Tucker also
supported strong protections for religious liberty. While Tucker's
writing embraced popular sovereignty and democracy, he opposed
broader suffrage, opposed one (white) person-one vote, and argued
for apportionment schemes that would protect wealth in land and
slaves from a broader democracy.
Tucker supported the existing Virginia legislative apportionment
plan, one that heavily favored slaveholding areas. In addition, he
proposed a plan to model representation in Virginia on "federal
numbers," counting slaves as three-fifths of a person.3 These
schemes were designed to protect concentrated wealth; they all gave
extra political power to slaveholders.' Still, to some extent, Tucker
also favored legal devices designed to protect democracy from an
aristocracy of certain kinds of wealth.5
Tucker's concern for the protection of concentrated wealth from
democracy was in serious tension with a more democratic vision
1. See generally ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exch.
1996) (1803) [hereinafter TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES].
2. St. George Tucker, Of the Several Forms of Government, in 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, ed. app. at 19-23 [hereinafter Tucker, Several Forms of
Government].
3. Christopher Leonard Doyle, Lord, Master, and Patriot: St. George Tucker and
Patriarchy in Republican Virginia 1772-1851, at 18-20 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Connecticut), microformed on UMI No. 9634532 (Univ. Microforms
Int'l).
4. Id. at 18-19.
5. See infra Part III.B.
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that was beginning to emerge in the nation. In 1830 and 1831, the
pro-slavery apportionment of the Virginia legislature helped defeat
a resolution aimed at ending slavery in Virginia.6 Tucker favored
state-supported education, but the type of representative govern-
ment Tucker favored may have helped to blight plans for public
education.7 Protecting the wealthy from taxes seems to have been
a factor in antebellum Virginia's refusal to establish a statewide
system of public education.
8
Tucker wrote that slavery was inconsistent with democracy, but
he did not elaborate on the insight.9 After Tucker's death, the
inconsistency became particularly stark. From one perspective, the
tension in Tucker's thought between democracy and the protection
of concentrated wealth in land and slaves is a problem from the
bygone age of slavery. Similarly, his struggle with race and slavery
may seem equally remote. From another perspective, the tension in
Tucker's thought is simply a special case of an ongoing dilemma for
American democracy, involving tensions between wealth, political
equality, race, and egalitarian ideals.
Parts II-IV of this Article will examine St. George Tucker's views
on slavery, free speech, wealth, democracy, and education. Part V
will examine later developments in Virginia on these issues before
the Civil War and will look at the later nineteenth-century career
of ideas raised in Tucker's work. These ideas include free speech,
states' rights, and the status to be accorded to free blacks. Finally,
Part VI will evaluate the ambiguous legacy of St. George Tucker.
6. ALISON GOODYEAR FREEHLING, DRIFT TOWARD DISSOLUTION: THE VIRGINIA SLAVERY
DEBATE OF 1831-1832, at 192-93 (1982).
7. See infra note 330 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 331 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Fred Arthur Bailey, Free Speech
and the Lost Cause in the Old Dominion, 103 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 237, 242 (1995).
9. ST. GEORGE TucKER, A DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY WITH A PROPOSAL FOR THE
GRADUAL ABOLITION OF IT IN THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 48 (Negro Univ. Press 1970) (1796)
[hereinafter TUCKER, DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY].
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I. ST. GEORGE TUCKER ON SLAVERY
A. Tucker's Condemnation of Slavery
St. George Tucker opened his 1796 Dissertation on Slavery with
an unequivocal condemnation of the institution:
Whilst America hath been the land of promise to Europeans
it hath been the vale of death to millions of the wretched sons of
Africa.... Whilst we were offering up vows at the shrine of
Liberty ... we were imposing upon our fellow men, who differ in
complexion from us, a slavery, ten thousand times more cruel
than the utmost extremity of those grievances and oppressions
of which we complained. Such are the inconsistencies of human
nature ... ; such that partial system of morality which confines
rights and injuries to particular complexions; such the effect of
that self-love which justifies, ... not according to principle, but to
the agent.' °
Tucker referred to the slaves that American revolutionaries had
failed to free as "our brethren whom we held in bondage.""
In Tucker's view, invocations of liberty and equality by support-
ers of the American Revolution were relevant to the morality of
slavery. 2 In contrast, in the 1857 Dred Scott decision, Chief Justice
Taney insisted that the framers of the Declaration of Independence
did not intend to include even free black descendants of slaves."
Taney insisted that free blacks were not included among "all men,"
who the Declaration announced were "created equal" and "endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights." 4
Tucker took a different view of the moral implications of revolu-
tionary maxims of equality. He said that slavery defied the solemn
and sacred truth that Virginians had made "the foundation of their
government": that "all men are by nature equally free and inde-
pendent"'." and "have certain rights of which they cannot deprive or
10. Id.
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id. at 25-28.
13. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1857).
14. Id. (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
15. TUCKER, DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY, supra note 9, at 28 (quoting VA. CONST. art.
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divest their posterity," including "the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the means of acquiring and possessing property."16 Nor, as
Tucker saw it, were the strong and clever entitled to enslave those
with lesser gifts. Men were entitled to equal privileges in spite of
the "bare unkindness of nature or of fortune."17
According to Tucker, slavery could not be reconciled with
American declarations of fundamental rights without degrading
slaves below the rank of human beings. 8 Though the "policy of [the
Virginia] legislature, as well as the practice of slave-holders,"
seemed to do just that, Tucker insisted that it was "time we should
admit the evidence of moral truth, and learn to regard them as our
fellow men."'" He attributed the coexistence of slavery with Vir-
ginia's Declaration of Rights to the "weakness and inconsistency of
human nature."2 °
Tucker's Dissertation on Slavery contains his "melancholy
review" of Virginia laws that deprived slaves "not only of the right
of property, and the right of personal liberty, but even the right of
personal security."'" Tucker wrote:
From this view of our jurisprudence respecting slaves, we are
unavoidably led to remark, how frequently the laws of nature
have been set aside in favour of institutions, the pure result of
prejudice, usurpation, and tyranny. We have found actions,
innocent or indifferent, punishable with a rigour scarcely due to
any, but the most atrocious offenses against civil society; justice
distributed by an unequal measure to the master and the slave;
and even the hand of mercy arrested ......
These horrors, Tucker believed, came not from the bloody temper
of Virginians but "from those political considerations indispensably
necessary, where slavery prevails to any great extent."2 To Tucker,
these facts showed the need to abolish slavery.
I,§ 1).
16. Id. at 48.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 48-49.
19. Id. at 49.
20. Id. at 28.
21. Id. at 55.
22. Id. at 64.
23. Id. at 65.
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In 1829, in State v. Mann, Justice Thomas Ruffin of the North
Carolina Supreme Court also said slavery required harsh powers
for masters.24 Ruffin held that a man who had leased a slave was
not guilty of any crime when the man shot the slave because the
slave had run away from him while he was "chastis[ing]" her.s"
Ruffin reasoned that the law must turn a blind eye to acts of cruelty
and barbarity aimed at slaves by their masters.2" He held that
"[t]he slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible that there is
no appeal from his master."27
Ironically, American revolutionaries, many of whom were
slaveholders, saw England as threatening them with slavery.
Tucker's analysis of three types of slavery explains why. First,
according to Tucker, a nation "deprived of the right of being
governed by its own laws ... may be considered as in a state of
political slavery."2
Second, Tucker described a state of "civil slavery" that exists
whenever natural liberty is "further restrained than is necessary
and expedient for the general advantage."29 He said that civil
slavery also exists whenever an inequality of rights or privileges
exists between the subjects or citizens of the same state, except
such as necessarily results from the exercise of a political office.3"
Tucker continued, "the pre-eminence of one class of men must be
founded and erected upon the depression of another; and the
measure of exaltation in the former, is that of the slavery of the
latter."3
Tucker said that this species of slavery existed in every govern-
ment in Europe before the French Revolution, in the American
colonies before independence, and
24. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 265-67 (1829) ("The power of the master must
be absolute to render the submission of the slave perfect. I most freely confess my sense of
the harshness of this proposition.").
25. Id. at 267.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. TuCKER, DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY, supra note 9, at 15.
29. Id. at 16.
30. Id. at 16-17.
31. Id. at 17.
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notwithstanding the maxims of equality which have been
adopted in their several constitutions, it exists in most, if not all,
of them, at this day, in the persons of our free Negroes and
mulattoes; whose civil incapacities are almost as numerous as
the civil rights of our free citizens.32
Tucker then enumerated examples of this second species of
slavery imposed on free blacks, including denial of suffrage and
political office, facing whippings for resistance to a white person,
denial of the right to testify in any prosecution or civil action where
a white man was a party, mandatory registration for free blacks
residing or employed in any town, and prohibition of the migration
of free blacks into Virginia.33 Anticipating Alexis de Tocqueville,
Tucker saw these "incapacities and disabilities" as the fruit of a
third type of slavery: "domestic [chattel] slavery." Domestic slavery
was a system where "one man is subject to be directed by another
in all his actions. 84
For Tucker, the evil of slavery was also reflected in the slave
trade.35 Tucker described the slave trade as a "nefarious ... traffic"
characterized by "the most atrocious aggravations of cruelty,
perfidy, and intrigues."36 Though some might seek to mitigate the
evil by blaming it on the African tribes that participated, Tucker
would have none of it.37 Following Blackstone, Tucker rejected the
claim that persons captured in war may be enslaved.3 Even if one
were to concede, Tucker said, that "a captive taken in a just war"
might be enslaved by the conqueror, that would not justify "the
claim of Europeans to reduce the natives of Africa" to slavery.39
"[T]he Europeans have ... by the most insidious (I had almost said
infernal) arts, fomented a kind of perpetual warfare among the ...
people of Africa" in order to produce a supply of slaves.40
32. Id.
33. Id. at 17-19 (noting, however, that an exception existed in the case of a wanton
assault on a black person).
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id. at 22.
36. Id. at 13.
37. See id. at 21-23.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 23.
40. Id. at 23-24.
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Among his arguments for ending slavery, Tucker included one
later made by abolitionists-the danger of slave revolts. He noted
that "so large a number of oppressed individuals" might "one day be
roused to an attempt to shake off their chains."41 When abolitionists
made this argument, it infuriated slaveholders, who read it as
tending (and therefore intended) to cause slave revolts.42
Tucker's condemnation of slavery was powerful. When he turned
to freeing the slaves, Tucker made many concessions to racial
prejudice, and he admitted that he was somewhat infected by it.43
His attitude is not surprising given the society in which he lived
and the practical political obstacles he faced. When the slaves were
finally freed by the Civil War and the Thirteenth Amendment, they
did far better, economically and politically, than Tucker expected,
and they did so in difficult circumstances.44
B. Thcker's Plan to Rid Virginia of Slavery
Total and immediate emancipation and full equality struck
Tucker as impractical. He had a negative view of the capacity of a
people subjected to years of slavery. 4 He thought immediate
emancipation would not work because blacks had been trained to
obedience and submission and whites were used to arrogance and
assumptions of superiority.46 Blacks "would soon become idle,
profligate, and miserable. Unfit for their new condition, and
unwilling to return to their former laborious course, they would
become the caterpillars of the earth, and the tigers of the human
race."
47
Tucker supported his view of the probable consequences of
general and immediate emancipation by the "recent history of the
41. Id. at 39.
42. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE":
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 133-34, 274-76 (2000).
43. TUCKER, DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY, supra note 9, at 84-85.
44. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863-1877 (1988) (undertaking an assessment of the successes, failures, legacy, and historical
interpretation of Reconstruction).
45. TUCKER, DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY, supra note 9, at 75.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 77.
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French West Indies."4 In what was then the French colony of Saint-
Dominque, slaves had rebelled against their masters.49 The French
sent an army to crush the rebellion, but the slaves won.5" After
their victory, the slaves renamed the country Haiti, killed many of
the country's whites, and destroyed the plantations and their
infrastructure in an effort to prevent rebuilding the plantation slave
system.5 Though emancipation through slave rebellion and race
war was significantly different from immediate voluntary emanci-
pation, Tucker apparently believed the results would be the same.52
Tucker also saw serious impediments to establishing a colony of
immediately emancipated slaves within the United States. He
doubted that the "illiterate and ignorant" former slaves would be
capable of instituting a government.5" "[A]ccustomed to be[ing]
ruled with a rod of iron," blacks "will not easily submit to milder
restraints. [They would become hordes of vagabonds, robbers and
murderers."54 In spite of these remarkably negative views, Tucker
also rejected simply expelling the slaves from the United States.55
He felt that expulsion would produce famine, disease, and misery
for the former slaves.56
Finally, Tucker considered retaining the blacks and incorporating
them into the Commonwealth of Virginia. 7 He was convinced,
however, by Jefferson's rejection of this option, which Tucker
quoted at length in a footnote:
Deep-rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousand
recollections by the blacks, of the injuries they have sustained;
new provocations; the real distinctions which nature has made;
and many other circumstances will divide us into parties and
produce convulsions which will probably never end but in the
extermination of one or the other race.58
48. Id.
49. JAREDDIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HoW SOCIETIES CHOOSETO FAILORSUCCEED 335 (2005).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. TUCKER, DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY, supra note 9, at 77.
53. Id. at 84.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 74-76.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 84-85.
58. Id. at 84-85 n.a (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OFVIRGINIA
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Tucker also noted Jefferson's other reason against "incorporation,"
namely speculations about the inferiority of blacks. 9 To his credit,
Tucker was skeptical of assertions of racial inferiority, but he did
not totally discount them.
According to Tucker, opponents of abolition said abolition
required establishing both civil and political equality.' This was, he
said, a potent argument for those who sought to perpetuate
slavery.6" Tucker, however, rejected the idea that civil and political
slavery must stand or fall together.62
When men enter society, according to Tucker, they have "a right
to admit, or exclude any description of persons ... they think
proper."63 If blacks might be inherently inferior, Tucker asked if
sound policy would not therefore "advise their exclusion from a
society in which they have not yet been admitted to participate in
civil rights?"'64 He warned that future admission might "eventually
depreciate the whole national character."65
Tucker frankly admitted that such concerns might reflect
prejudice. Remarkably, he said that "[e]arly prejudices ... would
render an inhabitant of a country where Negroe slavery prevails, an
improper umpire" between those who argued for and those who
denied racial inferiority.66 Still, where prejudices had taken "such
deep root in our minds, as to render it impossible to eradicate this
opinion," 7 Tucker suggested-anticipating Abraham Lincoln-that
"so general an error, if it be one" must be respected." But he
insisted that the need to accommodate prejudice did not justify
slavery. Tucker's metaphor reveals a negative view of the slaves:
"Shall we not relieve the necessities of the naked diseased beggar,
unless we will invite him to a seat at our table .... ,69
(1787)).
59. Id. at 87-88.
60. Id. at 86.
61. Id. at 86-87.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 87.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 87 n.b.
67. Id. at 87.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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So Tucker sought a middle course between immediate emancipa-
tion and full equality on one hand and continuance of chattel
slavery on the other, that is, "between the tyrannical and iniquitous
policy which holds so many human creatures in a state of grievous
bondage, and that which would turn loose a numerous, starving,
and enraged banditti, upon the innocent descendants of their
former oppressors." 70 He counted on "nature, time, and sound
policy" to produce a change that would avoid these extremes.7'
The "sound policy" Tucker advocated was his complex plan for
gradual emancipation. He proposed to free all female slaves born
after the passage of his act of emancipation.72 These freed slaves
would transmit freedom to all their children, both male and
female.73 Newly freed female children would be bound to service
until age twenty-eight, 7 but males born to slaves after the act's
passage would remain slaves.7 5 Males would begin to be freed only
if born to a freed female.76 This was gradual emancipation indeed.
Tucker adopted a plan for compulsory labor modeled on English
poor laws for those free blacks who lacked employment after being
freed.77
Because the law recognized property in slaves, Tucker suggested
that immediate and total emancipation without compensation
would violate property rights. 7' But Tucker's plan did not compen-
sate slaveholders for the loss of people who would have been born
as slaves.79 He justified that feature of his plan in two ways. First,
he denied property rights in unborn children.' Second, he said that
the loss of the mother's labor for nine months and maintenance of
the child until age twelve or fourteen "is amply compensated by the
services of that child for as many years more, as he has been an
expence to them."'"
70. Id. at 88.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 89.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 89-90.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 79-80.
79. Id. at 94.
80. Id. at 94-95.
81. Id. at 95.
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Under Tucker's plan, free blacks would have been denied many
rights. To use terms Tucker uses elsewhere in his dissertation,
"civil slavery" would replace "domestic slavery." 2 Blacks would be
denied the right to vote, hold public office, own property, keep arms,
marry whites, serve on juries, testify against whites, and make a
will. 3 Still, Tucker said, "[t]heir personal rights, and their property,
though limited, would, whilst they remain among us, be under the
protection of the laws."' Their condition, he said, would be similar
to that of "the labouring poor in most other countries. Under such
an arrangement we might reasonably hope, that time would either
remove from us a race of men, whom we wish not to incorporate
with us, or obliterate those prejudices, which now form an obstacle
to such incorporation." 5 He seems not to have seen that such a
caste system would perpetrate prejudice.
Tucker faced the dilemma of the reformer whose proposed reform
confronts deep prejudices. He admitted that his harsh discrimina-
tions against free blacks "appear to savour strongly of prejudice." 6
But a reformer facing deep prejudices, he suggested, "must either
encounter, or accommodate himself to prejudice.-I have preferred
the latter; not that I pretend to be wholly exempt from [prejudice]
"87
Tucker justified his approach as necessary to "avoid as many
obstacles as possible to the ... abolition of slavery."' Though Tucker
opposed banishing blacks, he wrote, "I wish not to encourage their
future residence among us. By denying them the most valuable
privileges which civil government affords, I wished to render it their
inclination and their interest to seek those privileges in some other
climate." 9 After all, he concluded, "[b]y releasing them from the
yoke of bondage, and enabling them to seek happiness wherever
they can hope to find it, we surely confer a benefit, which no one can
82. Id. at 16, 20.
83. Id. at 91-92.
84. Id. at 94.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 92.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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sufficiently appreciate, who has not tasted of the bitter curse of
compulsory servitude."9 °
These concessions to bigotry put practical obstacles in the way of
emancipation. If, as Tucker envisioned, blacks abandoned the
commonwealth that subjected them to cruel discriminations,
Virginia would need to replace a large part of its laboring popula-
tion. Since Tucker's plan was extremely gradual, he apparently
hoped that Caucasian immigrants would fill the void.9'
Tucker's Dissertation on Slavery was dedicated "[t]o the General
Assembly of Virginia," and he sent copies to both houses with a
request for consideration.92 The House tabled the matter without
discussion,93 and the Senate thanked Tucker and expressed a vague
hope that one day "[1]iberty in our country shall be inseparable from
life."94
Tucker was disappointed with the lack of interest in his work. He
wrote to a correspondent in Massachusetts that no one had even
read his proposal;95 self-interest had silenced "the voice of reason,"96
but he hoped that one day "actual suffering ... will open the oppres-
sor's eyes."97 In the meantime, Tucker gave up hope for action on
emancipation in the foreseeable future.9"
Tucker's Dissertation expresses empathy for slaves, but his
expressed empathy did not often appear in Tucker's personal
relations with his own slaves.99 Tucker apparently suffered from
some of the blinding self-interest that he saw as an obstacle to his
emancipation plan. If so, it was a very human failing. About the
time that Tucker wrote his letter to the Virginia Assembly trans-
mitting his anti-slavery dissertation, Tucker wrote a letter to his
agent enclosing a power of attorney that authorized his agent to
sell several of his female slaves.'00 'The high price of negroes at
90. Id. at 93.
91. Cf. id. at 92-93 (encouraging slaves to seek happiness outside the colonies).
92. FREEHLING, supra note 6, at 95.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 95-96.
97. Id. at 96.
98. Id.
99. Doyle, supra note 3, at 105-06.
100. Id. at 105.
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present," Tucker wrote, encouraged him to expect more than the
two hundred pounds that he specified as the minimum price.''
With respect to these slaves, Tucker rejected an offer from a
Virginian who wanted to free them." 2 The man, short of cash, had
offered Tucker western land bonds in exchange for the slaves.0 3
Tucker's treatment of his slaves often revealed "an entrepreneur
adept at squeezing maximum profit" from slavery.0 4
A few of Tucker's fellow Virginians were more consistent in
advocating human rights for slaves and were able to identify far
better with slaves as human beings. One was Robert Pleasants, a
wealthy member of Virginia's elite and an anti-slavery Quaker.0 5
In 1783, Pleasants freed eighty of his own slaves valued at three
thousand pounds sterling.0 6 He also founded an abolition society in
Richmond, wrote anti-slavery tracts, and supported black educa-
tion.107 Pleasants also fought a two-year, and ultimately successful,
legal battle to enforce his father's will,' which attempted to free
his father's slaves before state law allowed such action.0 9 Pleasants
believed that "blacks and whites could co-exist as equals" and
thought that plans to remove ex-slaves were futile and unjust.110
On May 30, 1797, Pleasants wrote Tucker a letter critiquing
Tucker's Dissertation on Slavery."' Pleasants wrote that he favored
a more rapid gradual emancipation, one that would free all slaves,
not just female slaves, born after the act's passage. Pleasants also
disapproved of Tucker's 'proposition of prohibiting free Negroes
and Mulattoes from holding estates in land, or other property, or to
be restrained by law from contracting marriages with whites,
101. Id.
102. Id. at 107.
103. Id. at 107-08.
104. Id. at 106; see also id. at 105-21 (discussing Tucker's willingness to employ his slaves
with an eye toward maximizing profit).
105. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 69
(1975).
106. Doyle, supra note 3, at 247.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 319-25 (1799). For a discussion of the case
and its significance, see COVER, supra note 105, at 67-71.
110. Doyle, supra note 3, at 147-48.
111. Id.
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disposing of property by will, or enjoying other rights of citizens." 12
He said that '"labouring people are ... the riches of every
country.""1 Because slaves made up the bulk of Virginia's work
force, if they were given ...suitable encouragement and proper
instruction,"' it would benefit Virginia to retain them." 4
In writing back to Pleasants, Tucker defended the discriminatory
provisions in the Dissertation as the only hope for passage of a plan
for abolition.1 He admitted that '"there was in one instance a
degree of prejudice in my own breast .... I mean the prohibition of
intermarriages."'11
Pleasants asked Tucker to sign a petition to the legislature
asking for emancipation without many of the restrictions Tucker
proposed. Tucker said that he doubted that Pleasants' plan 'will
ever meet with success"' and that he did not fully agree with it, 7
but he signed as requested. 8
II. TUCKER ON FREE SPEECH ON ALL PUBLIC MEASURES
A basic principle of democracy is the right of the people to rule
directly or through their elected representatives. The sovereignty
of the people assumes that the people are capable of making basic
political choices. Meaningful choice requires the right to discuss
public measures, including those that challenge dominant political
and economic institutions. In 1799, Tucker recognized that
democratic government requires broad protection of free speech.
In his 1799 Letter to a Member of Congress Respecting the Alien
and Sedition Act, Tucker attacked the Sedition Act as inconsistent
with the First Amendment. 19 A major strand of Tucker's argument
was based on popular sovereignty, states' rights, and a limited
112. Letter from Robert Pleasants to St. George Tucker (May 30, 1797), quoted in Doyle,
supra note 3, at 148.
113. Id. at 150.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 148.
116. Id. at 149.
117. Id. at 310 n.236.
118. Id. at 151.
119. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A LETTER TO A MEMBER OF CONGRESS; RESPECTING THE ALIEN
AND SEDITION LAWS (1799) [hereinafter TUCKER, LETTER TO A MEMBER OF CONGRESS].
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reading of federal power. 12o In addition to those arguments, Tucker
made functional and structural arguments for broad protection of
free speech, claiming that broad protection of free speech was
essential to democratic government.
Tucker began his discussion with twelve basic postulates. Of
these, at least the first nine were related to popular sovereignty and
states' rights. (1)"[T]he SOVEREIGNTY of the United States
resides in the PEOPLE.... ,"11 (2) The Constitution created the
federal government and limited its powers.'22 (3) The federal
government had only that portion of the people's sovereign power
entrusted to its "public functionaries" who were "the agents and
servants of the PEOPLE." 2 ' (4) Prior to the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States the states were sovereign and
independent and had all the attributes of a sovereign power.'24 (5)
"Consequently; that the powers not delegated to" the federal
government "by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states,
[were] reserved to the states ... or to the people."'25 (6) The federal
government was limited to "expressly" delegated powers and those
"necessary and proper" to effectuate them.'26 (7) Enumeration of
powers "weakens" the force of the law "in cases not enumerated."'27
(8) "[E]very power which was carved out of the sovereignty of the
states ... is to be construed strictly, wherever it may derogate from
any power reserved to the states by the federal constitution."'28 (9)
Every federal power which may impair "the rights of citizens
granted to secure the blessings of liberty" is to be strictly construed
and "where [such power] may operate to the security and preserva-
tion of those blessings" it is to be construed 'liberally, and for their
benefit."'29
120. Id. at 39.
121. Id. at 2.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id. Tucker's ninth postulate combines concern with protection of individual rights
against the federal government with his limited reading of federal power. See id.
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In addition to these nine postulates, Tucker advanced three that,
like popular sovereignty, dealt directly with the system of freedom
of expression required for democratic government. Although the
term "democrat" was sometimes hurled as a term of abuse at this
time in American history, Tucker repeatedly referred to the
American government as democratic: (10) In the United States
the people are sovereign. "[I]n a representative government it is
essential ... that the people should be fully informed of the conduct
of their servants, and possess the uncontrolable right of censuring,
or approving, according to their judgment."130 (11) This right
includes the "equally uncontrolable right to examine the motives
which probably led to that conduct, which they have a right to
censure or applaud."131 (12) When the right of the citizen to criticize
is denied, "the practical right of election is in danger," and when it
is prohibited, "the nature of the government [is] changed.' 3 2
Tucker also made a textual argument in favor of free speech and
press by comparing the First Amendment with the Sedition Act.133
Tucker italicized what he saw as the inconsistency between the
First Amendment and the Act. The First Amendment prohibited
any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,"34
whereas the Sedition Act punished any person who shall "write,
print, utter or publish ... any false, scandalous and malicious
writing[s]" against the President, Congress, or the U.S. government
"with intent to defame" any of them.135 The texts, he said, "do not
militate with each other; nor with the fundamental principles of our
representative democracy. )136
Tucker understood, as many of his contemporaries did not, a
crucial part of the idea of a loyal opposition. He understood that
criticism of government officials and their policies must not be
confused with an attack on government. In this respect, Tucker's
views mirrored those expressed by a number of critics of the
Sedition Act who insisted that criticism of public officials and their
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 29.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 30.
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policies was essential for a functioning representative govern-
ment. 1
37
Defenders of the Sedition Act had insisted that the power "to
punish false, scandalous and malicious writings against the
government, with intent to stir up sedition" was a law necessary and
proper for carrying out the national government's delegated
powers. 138 Tucker responded:
[Were it granted them (which is by no means the case) that
congress has a right to pass a law to punish ... writings against
the government with "intent to stir up sedition," it would not
prove that it had a right to pass an act to punish writings
calculated to bring congress or the President into contempt or
disrepute. For such contempt or disrepute may be entertained...
without incurring the guilt of sedition against the government,
and without the most remote design of opposing or resisting any
law, or any act of the president done in pursuance of any
law.... 1
3 9
The pro-Sedition Act report that Tucker criticized in his Letter to
a Member of Congress also argued that "it would be manifestly
absurd to suppose that a government might punish sedition, and
yet be void of power to prevent it, by punishing those acts which
plainly and necessarily lead to it."'4 ° By this view, government could
punish speech that had a tendency to cause sedition. Tucker
forthrightly rejected this bad tendency argument. If accepted, he
wrote, "we have ... delivered ourselves bound hand and foot into the
power of the federal government."'' Tucker continued:
137. E.g., CURTIS, supra note 42, at 68-69, 73, 75.
138. TUCKER, LETER TO A MEMBER OF CONGRESS, supra note 119, at 30.
139. Id. James Roger Sharp cites a speech in Congress by Albert Gallatin making a similar
distinction between opposition to the administration and opposition to the Constitution.
JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIc: THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS
179 (1993). The distinction is implicit in many Republican criticisms of the Sedition Act. See,
e.g., supra note 137 and accompanying text. Another important component of the idea of a
loyal opposition is recognizing that one's benighted opponents are nonetheless loyal to the
nation. That has proved more difficult, both in the early Republic and since. See generally
SHARP, supra, at 5, 7, 141-42, 274, 281-82, 286-87 (discussing the difficulties of recognizing
loyal opposition).
140. TUCKER, LETTER TO A MEMBER OF CONGRESS, supra note 119, at 30-31.
141. Id. at 31.
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An expression of disapprobation of any measure of government
may be construed plainly and necessarily to lead to sedition; the
smallest complaint, might receive the same construction; the
most respectful remonstrance ... [is] liable to the same liberal
interpretation; any argument in defence of an opinion uttered on
the subject, might be tortured into a seditious speech, and as
such, according to this doctrine punished as leading to
sedition.42
Tucker also rejected the claim that press freedom was limited to
a ban on prior restraint-that one could publish without permission
but be punished afterward for what was written. He said that the
precedent supporting that truncated view of press freedom
originated in "that mirror of justice, the high court of star chamber,
in England."'43 Parliament itself had rejected the star chamber as
the "means to introduce an arbitrary power and government."'44
Remarkably, and like other Jeffersonian Republicans, Tucker
seems to have rejected the claim that punishing the "licentiousness
of the press" was not an "abridgement of its liberty."'45 Tucker
argued that the "word, licentiousness, as applied to the PRESS, and
to writings against the government, is a word of the most indefinite
signification of any in the English language." 46 Finally, Tucker
quoted James Burgh, the British educator and political writer: "All
history shews the necessity, in order to the preservation of liberty,
of the subjects having a watchful eye on the conduct of governments
and of every subject being not only secured, but encouraged in
alarming his fellow-subjects, on occasion of every attempt on public
liberty.""47 Tucker said that the claim that governments have
always exercised power to punish criticism did not justify continu-
142. Id.
143. Id. at 33.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 35.
146. Id.; see, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 42, at 70 ("Licentiousness 'was so indefinite a thing,
that what was deemed licentiousness today by one set of men, might, by another set,
tomorrow, be enlarged ...." (quoting Congressman John Nicholas)); id. at 76 ("[M]en find no
difficulty in pronouncing opinions to be both false and licentious, which differs from their
own." (quoting John Taylor)). Though Tucker's remark was made in connection with an
exercise of federal power, logically applied it raised similar questions about the concept of
licentiousness as a tool by state governments to limit speech.
147. TucKER, LETTER TO A MEMBER OF CONGRESS, supra note 119, at 36.
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ing the abuse. He cited provisions for press freedom in the Virginia
Declaration of Rights and emphasized that other states had similar
guarantees. 1
48
In his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, Tucker also
embraced a functional view of free speech and press, a view
suited to democratic government. Here, however, some federalism
qualifications begin to appear. According to Tucker, it was "one of
the great fundamental principles of the American governments,
that the people are the sovereign, and those who administer the
government their agents, and servants, not their kings and mas-
ters.' 49 Consequently, "it would have been a political solecism to
have permitted the smallest restraint upon the right of the people
to enquire into, censure, approve, punish or reward their agents."'5 °
Therefore,
[t]he constitution ... secures to them the unlimited right to do
this, either by speaking, writing, printing, or by any other mode
of publishing .... This being the only mode by which the responsi-
bility of the agents of the public can be secured, and practically
enforced, the smallest infringement of the rights guaranteed by
[the First Amendment to the United States Constitution] must
threaten the total subversion of the government. For a represen-
tative democracy ceases to exist the moment that the public
functionaries are by any means absolved from their responsibil-
ity to their constituents; and this happens whenever the
constituent can be restrained in any manner from speaking,
writing, or publishing his opinions upon any public measure, or
upon the conduct of those who may advise or execute it.'5'
Tucker also embraced liberty of speech and discussion in all
speculative matters. The liberty consisted of
the absolute and uncontrollable right of speaking, writing, and
publishing, our opinions concerning any subject, whether
religious, philosophical, or political; ... the expediency or
148. Id. at 37-38.
149. St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 TUCKER,
BLAcKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, ed. app. at 297 [hereinafter Tucker, View of the
Constitution].
150. Id.
151. Id.
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inexpediency of all public measures, with their tendency and
probable effect; the conduct of public men, and generally every
other subject, without restraint, except as to the injury of any
other individual, in his person, property, or good name."2
The extent to which the personal injury and property exceptions
limit Tucker's democratic rationale for free speech is unclear.
Tucker said any power to restrain speech was left to the states
by the federal Constitution.'53 Still, his structural and functional
arguments for free speech reasonably applied to state govern-
ments, which he also considered democratic. Tucker noted that
state constitutions also typically had protections for free speech and
press. 154
Still, Tucker's 1803 discussion of press freedom, written when the
Jeffersonians were in power, seems far more restrained than his
1799 essay written when the Republicans were in opposition. In
1799, Tucker doubted that the idea of 'licentiousness" was a useful
way of thinking about press freedom. 55 In 1803, after asking if no
protection for reputation existed, Tucker pointed to state law. He
"explicitly disavow[ed] the most distant approbation of... licentious-
ness. A free press, conducted with ability, firmness, decorum, and
impartiality, may be regarded as the chaste nurse of genuine liberty
., However, a press "stained with falsehood, imposture,
detraction, and personal slander, resemble[d] a contaminated
prostitute.'5 7 He emphasized the
obligation to submit to the judgment of those whose authority
[the writer] cannot legally, or constitutionally dispute. In his
statements of facts he is bound to adhere strictly to the truth;
for any deviation from the truth is both an imposition upon the
public, and an injury to the individual whom it may respect. In
152. St. George Tucker, Of the Right of Conscience; and of the Freedom of Speech and of
the Press, in 2 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, ed. app. at 11
[hereinafter Tucker, Right of Conscience] (emphasis added).
153. Id. ed. app. at 13.
154. TUCKER, LETTER TO A MEMBER OF CONGRESS, supra note 119, at 38; see also Tucker,
Right of Conscience, supra note 152, ed. app. at 13, 19-21 (referring to the Virginia Bill of
Rights and contrasting rights in American constitutions to the British approach).
155. Tucker, Right of Conscience, supra note 152, ed. app. at 29.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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his restrictures on the conduct of men, in public stations, he is
bound to do justice to their characters, and not to criminate
them without substantial reason .... Whoever knowingly departs
from any of these maxims is guilty of a crime against the
community, as well as against the person injured ..... S
Tucker concluded this branch of his discussion by noting that,
although the federal Constitution wisely prohibited federal
restraint on freedom of the press, "yet for injuries done the
reputation of any person, as an individual, the state-courts are
always open, and may afford ... competent redress."1" 9 In 1799,
Tucker saw the uncontrollable right to criticize as essential to
representative government. By 1803, he was more guarded.
What Tucker meant by his exceptions to the right of citizens to
criticize the conduct of public officials is hard to determine. Tucker
limited state power over speech to the power to punish defamation,
defined as false statements of fact about a person's individual, as
opposed to political, character. But his references to the "conduct of
men, in public stations" suggested a broader power to suppress
criticism."e A broadly defined power to suppress speech in order to
protect property could also undermine the right to criticize slavery.
That view seems inconsistent with Tucker's understanding of the
function of free speech in a democracy and with his own criticism
of slavery.
Tucker did not live to see the full extent of the uproar over
abolitionist attacks on slavery and calls for immediate abolition.
As a result, we cannot know how he would have responded in
Virginia's emotionally charged climate in the thirty or so years
before the Civil War.
One might attempt to reconcile Tucker's 1799 and 1803 views by
noting that in 1799 he addressed federal government action while
in 1803 he referred to state action. Still, if, as Tucker suggests, "a
representative democracy ceases to exist ... whenever the constitu-
ent can be restrained in any manner from speaking, writing, or
publishing his opinions upon any public measure, or upon the
158. Id.
159. Id. ed. app. at 30.
160. Id. ed. app. at 29.
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conduct of those who may advise or execute it,"161 then a broad right
to criticize the policies of public men and to advocate public
measures must also exist against state governments. Tucker's
principle of the unrestrained right to publish "opinions on any
public measure,""1 if fully controlling, also supports the right to
criticize slavery and urge its abolition. In the end, after Tucker was
dead, southern states proscribed anti-slavery expression, including
that of Lincoln's Republican Party.
16 3
If Tucker's approach to free speech in 1803 represented a retreat
from libertarian statements about the right to criticize public
officials, he was not alone in suggesting restriction. In 1803,
President Thomas Jefferson wrote Thomas McKean, the governor
of Pennsylvania, complaining about the press' "licentiousness [and]
lying."164 Jefferson urged selective prosecutions under state law to
avoid the appearance of a persecution."6 ' In 1804, Jefferson wrote
Abigail Adams to explain that, while the federal government lacked
power over the press, states could act against "the overwhelming
torrent of slander, which is confounding all vice and virtue, all truth
& falsehood in the U.S." 66 Jefferson, in a phrase similar to
Tucker's, referred to the "prostitution" of the press.6 7
James Burgh, the English political writer and educator whom
Tucker cited in 1799, took a less equivocal stand in favor of the
right to criticize public officials. According to Burgh, subjects had
a right and a duty to keep "a watchful eye on the conduct of Kings,
Ministers, and Parliament." 6 ' Indeed, Burgh said, subjects should
161. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 149, ed. app. at 297.
162. Id.
163. CURTIS, supra note 42, at 260-99 (discussing suppression of antislavery speech in the
South). For an extensive statement of Republican views, see the speech of Representative
James Wilson infra text accompanying note 291.
164. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas McKean (Feb. 19,1803), in FREEDOMOFTHE
PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 364 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1996) [hereinafter FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS].
165. Id.
166. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in FREEDOM OFTHE
PRESS, supra note 164, at 367.
167. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas McKean, supra note 164 ('The federalists
having failed in destroying the freedom of the press by their gag-law, seem to have attacked
it in an opposite form, that is by pushing it's licentiousness & it's lying to such a degree of
prostitution as to deprive it of all credit."); see also id. at 372.
168. 3 JAMES BURGH, PoLuITcAL DISQUISrITONs 247 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1774).
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be encouraged to alarm their "fellow subjects" of "every attempt on
public liberty."'69 Otherwise, the state might be ruined by the
"blunders" or "villainies" of their leaders.170 Allegedly libelous words
in legal proceedings or petitions to Parliament were not punishable,
Burgh said, because "freedom of speech and writing [were] indis-
pensably necessary to the carrying on of business.'' Similarly, he
suggested, a broad immunity from legal consequences was neces-
sary for all subjects because they were concerned in the business of
representative government.
172
Burgh believed that truth was not a sufficient defense to a charge
of libeling a public official, and he anticipated the idea of libel law
as chilling truthful speech. People should be able to say or write
what they please "on the conduct of those who undertake the
management of national affairs.... For if you punish the slanderer,
you deter the fair inquirer."'v
Even assuming that Tucker embraced a broad protection for free
speech at the state and national levels, his aristocratic insistence
on protecting the political power of slavery to protect wealth in
slaves would later prove to be in substantial tension with his
democratic theory. Extra political power protected slavery and, as
future events were to show, slavery threatened democracy. Slavery
undermined free speech and broad education, both of which are
crucial for meaningful political freedom.174
169. Id.
170. Id. at 246.
171. Id. at 247.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 254. For a luminous article containing a discussion of Burgh, see Stephen A.
Smith, The Origins of the Free Speech Clause, in 29 FREE SPEECH YEARBOOK: THE MEANING
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 48, 66-72 (Raymond S. Rodgers ed., 1991).
174. See generally CURTIS, supra note 42, at 194-288 (describing legal theories supporting
and opposing the suppression of free speech). This assumes, of course, that the right to
advocate peaceful change on the issue of slavery is protected speech and suppression of such
speech on the leading political issue of the day is inconsistent with democracy. See id. at 421-
22.
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III. TUCKER ON PROTECTING WEALTH: AN ECONOMIC
CONSERVATISM IN TENSION WITH DEMOCRACY
A. Slavery, Race, and Democracy: One White Man, One Vote?
Tucker favored extra political power for people holding wealth in
the form of land and slaves. That system left the fate of slavery to
a political system dominated by slaveholders. Such a system was
not likely to favor emancipation. Of course, other substantial
obstacles to emancipation existed, including racism and fears that
nonslaveholding whites had of competition from newly freed slaves.
Even if a fairly apportioned Virginia legislature had passed laws
designed to abolish slavery, what the result would have been is
unclear. Perhaps the heavily slaveholding areas would have seceded
from the rest of Virginia before the Civil War, or perhaps Virginia
would itself have dissolved into civil war.
Of course, extra political power for slavery was not a new idea.
The Three-Fifths Clause 175 gave extra political power to the slave
states. At the same time, southern state laws and constitutions
often gave extra state legislative power to sections of the slave
states holding the largest number of slaves. Some southern states
also had three-fifths clauses for one or both houses of the legisla-
ture. In others, such as Virginia, malapportionment gave extra
political power to counties with the greatest numbers of slaves.'76
In 1776, Virginia's easternmost and heavily slaveholding
counties, with about one-third of the commonwealth's white
population, had a majority in both houses of the legislature.
Furthermore, in 1776, suffrage was limited to white males who
owned one hundred acres of unimproved land or twenty-five acres
with a house. 7 7 In his Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson
criticized these undemocratic arrangements and suggested
reforms. 178 In 1785, the Virginia legislature reduced the voting
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
176. See generally Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern Sectionalism 1819-
1848, in 5 A HISTORY OFTHE SOUTH 44-50,283-87 (Wendell Holmes Stephenson & E. Merton
Coulter eds., 1948) (comparing the legislative structure of several southern states, most
notably Virginia, in the early nineteenth century).
177. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS
243 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Literary Classics of the United States 1984) (1781-1782).
178. Id. at 274-75.
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requirement to fifty acres of unimproved land, allowing between
forty and fifty percent of the commonwealth's adult males to vote. 
179
Tucker opposed reform of the legislature in the direction of
greater democracy. He thought that representation in the legisla-
ture should reflect the benefits and burdens of government as
experienced by different classes. The rich lands and valuable slaves
of the Tidewater region exposed slaveholders to higher taxes.
Because "[1ands and slaves have ever been the subjects of the
productive revenues of the state, and will probably so remain,"
Tucker believed that these areas should have extra political
power." ° "[Imt ought to be a fundamental principle," Tucker
suggested, "that taxation and representation should be equal and
always go hand in hand." 8 '
Tucker thought that extra political power was essential to protect
the wealthy minority. In the South, this minority was composed
largely of slaveholders. Tucker argued:
[I]f they who pay nothing, or very little, are entrusted with the
imposition of burdens, of which they are to feel no part, there is
too much reason, from the experience of all ages and countries,
to apprehend that they may be regardless of the burden they
impose; especially if the question should relate to the compensa-
tion to be made to themselves, or their own immediate constitu-
ents .... 182
Tucker also rejected representation based on the number of fighting
men, a view suggested by Jefferson's Notes on the State of
Virginia.'s In times of peace, Tucker said, no fighting is required,
and "the whole burden of government is altogether pecuniary."'" In
times of war, fighting men bear a personal burden, but, he sug-
gested, such burdens end with the end of the war."8 5 "[P]ecuniary
burdens" of government must also increase during war, but the
179. FREEHLING, supra note 6, at 338.
180. St. George Tucker, Of the Constitution of Virginia, in 1 TuCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, ed. app. at 102-03 [hereinafter Tucker, Virginia Constitution];
see also Doyle, supra note 3, at 20.
181. Doyle, supra note 3, at 21.
182. Tucker, Virginia Constitution, supra note 180, ed. app. at 101.
183. Id. ed. app. at 101-02.
184. Id. ed. app. at 101.
185. Id.
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taxpayers "may continue to pay [those burdens] for a century, or
perhaps forever."18 This view ignores the long-term effects of lost
opportunities and the long-term burden imposed on a family by the
death or serious injury of a soldier.
Tucker invoked the precedent of the federal Constitutional
Convention. There the South rejected representation based on
fighting men and insisted instead on counting slaves as three-fifths
of a person. Just as slave representation swelled the South's
electoral power in the nation, Tucker said it should swell that of
Virginia's slaveholding regions." 7 Tucker favored a reapportion-
ment reform that would make Virginia's voting districts follow the
congressional districts crafted under the three-fifths rule.'88 Under
this approach, in 1802, a congressman from the western Fifth
District represented "over twice the number of white constituents
as his counterpart from the Tidewater Eighteenth."189
Tucker's views on representation are consistent with his
economic conservatism. For Tucker, the economic inequality that
characterized his society was a natural result of freedom and
varying human talents, and needed protection. Tucker said that
"equality, in a democracy, is to be understood, [as] equality of civil
rights, and not of condition. Equality of rights necessarily produces
inequality of possessions .... [S]ome men have more ... skill and
ingenuity ... and their property must become unequal.""s Tucker
did not consider the effects of inheritance.' 9' Nor, for that matter,
did he discuss how political power is often used to promote the
interests of wealth,'92 or how poverty might blight natural talents.
Professor Doyle writes that suffrage and apportionment laws
favoring rich slaveholders "exacerbate[d] material inequality,
promote[d] popular ignorance ..., and hinder[ed] enlightened
decisionmaking at the polls."'93 Substantial tension existed between
186. Id.
187. See id. ed. app. at 101-02.
188. Doyle, supra note 3, at 19-20.
189. Id. at 19.
190. Tucker, Several Forms of Government, supra note 2, ed. app. at 28.
191. Doyle, supra note 3, at 31.
192. Seegenerally KEVIN PHILLIPs, WEALTHAND DEMOCRAcY:APoLITIcALHISTORYOFTHE
AMERICAN RICH 201-48 (2002) (offering a historical summary of "government, political
influence, and wealth" in the United States).
193. Doyle, supra note 3, at 31.
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Tucker's support for popular sovereignty and a democratic republic,
and his elitist political views.
Tucker's support for restricted suffrage was not shared by all
political thinkers. Jefferson, as we have seen, favored expanding
Virginia's suffrage. Specifically, Jefferson favored universal white
male suffrage along with equal representation.19 James Burgh, a
writer Tucker cited in 1799, also argued for vastly expanded
suffrage in Great Britain. In his Political Disquisitions, Burgh
wrote that "[e]very man has what may be called property, and
unalienable property. Every man has a life, a personal liberty, a
character, a right to his earnings, a right to a religious profession
and worship according to his conscience . As a result, Burgh
said, "the poor are in danger of being injured by the government in
a variety of ways."'96 Still, he acknowledged the "commonly received
doctrine, that servants, and those who receive alms, have no right
to vote for members of parliament. 197 As a result, he wrote, "an
immense multitude of the people are utterly deprived of all power
in determining who shall be the protectors of their lives, their
personal liberty, their little property ... and the chastity of their
wives and daughters."'98
Burgh said that in the aggregate the 'little property" of the poor
amounted to "a very great object."'199 Although the poor were given
"no share in determining who shall be the lawgivers," they bore "a
very heavy share" of the tax burden, including taxes on malt, beer,
leather, soap, and candles, which were "paid chiefly by the poor."200
These taxes, he said, were equivalent to "a heavy land-tax. The
landed interest would complain grievously if they had no power
of electing representatives."' 0' 1 So, Burgh favored representation
for all who paid taxes. Burgh also criticized parliamentary mal-
194. RICHARD K. MATTHEWS, THE RADICAL PoLmcs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: A
REvIsIONIsT VIEW 78-79 (1984).
195. 1 BURGH, supra note 168, at 37.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 37-38.
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apportionment by which the number of persons represented by
members of parliament was grossly unequal.2 °2
B. Tucker on Entail and Primogenture
Although Tucker favored extra political power for the wealthy
and supported a malapportioned legislature to ensure it, he also
seems to have favored steps to limit the development of a heredi-
tary aristocracy of wealth. Today, this dual concern may strike
some as paradoxical. But others, including Daniel Webster,
expressed similar ideas. Webster, speaking in 1820, said, "[a]
republican form of government rests not more on political constitu-
tions, than on those laws which regulate the descent and transmis-
sion of property.""2 According to Webster, "The freest government,
if it could exist, would not be long acceptable, if the tendency of the
laws were to create a rapid accumulation of property in few hands,
and to render the great mass of the population dependant, and
penniless." °4 Indeed, Webster believed that "[u]niversal suffrage...
could not long exist in a community where there was great inequal-
ity of property."' ' Still, Webster, like other Massachusetts conser-
vatives on the issue of suffrage, advocated maintaining property
qualifications in one branch of the Massachusetts legislature.2 6
Like Tucker, Webster insisted that "property should have its due
weight and consideration," with political protections to prevent
"revolutions against property.2 °7
In Virginia's government, Tucker said that certain fundamentals
"ought to be fixed [in the commonwealth's constitution] beyond the
power of the ordinary legislature to alter. 208 These concerned "the
rights of the citizen" and, remarkably, "the disposition of the
202. Id. at 39-54.
203. DANIEL WEBSTER, FIRST SETTLEMENT OF NEW ENGLAND (1820), reprinted in
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA 199 (Andrew M. Scott ed., 1965).
204. Id. at 200.
205. Id.
206. DANIEL WEBSTER, SPEECH ON "APPORTIONMENT OF THE SENATE" IN THE
MASSACHUSETTS STATE CONVENTION OF 1820-1821, reprinted in POLITICAL THOUGHT IN
AMERICA, supra note 203, at 201.
207. Id. at 203.
208. Tucker, Virginia Constitution, supra note 180, ed. app. at 117.
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permanent property within the state."2 °9 Tucker wanted two
constitutional provisions relating to the disposition of permanent
property: "the abolition of entails, and the establishment of the
succession to estates, in parcenary."" ° The Virginia parcenary
statute that Tucker favored provided for equal division among all
male and female children.211 According to Tucker, the statute
abolished the common law rule that, if "any person having title to
an estate of inheritance in fee simple" died intestate, the estate
passed to the eldest son.212
One might think that Tucker's constitutional concerns were
simply about a freer market in land. That, however, seems not to be
the case. Rather, Tucker described abolition of entail and succession
to estates in parcenary as "two fundamental laws of a democratic
state., 21 3 Though the reference is cryptic, Tucker seems to hold a
view that was once widely accepted. That view saw democracy as
opposed to aristocracy, and aristocracy as related to excessive
concentration of economic power, especially in land.214
This view was expressed by Alexis de Tocqueville. Writing in the
1830s, de Tocqueville suggested that the inheritance laws ought
"to be placed at the head of all political institutions; for they
exercise an incredible influence upon the social state of a people,
while political laws show only what this state already is. 215
209. Id.
210. Id. Entail allowed testators or donors to provide that their real property should
descend to and remain the property of their heirs. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 572 (8th ed.
2004). Tucker opposed this device, which required property to remain in the family and to
be held by successive heirs. Parcenary, which Tucker favored, was a statute that applied
when a person who held real property died without a will.
211. St. George Tucker, Discourse Concerning the Several Acts Directing the Course of
Descents, in Virginia, in 3 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, ed. app. at
18-19 [hereinafter Tucker, Descents in Virginia].
212. Id. ed. app. at 14-15.
213. Tucker, Virginia Constitution, supra note 180, ed. app. at 117 (emphasis added).
214. See James Harrington, A System of Politics, in THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES
HARRINGTON 833, 848-49 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1977).
215. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 47-48 (Phillips Bradley, Henry
Reeve & Francis Borren eds., Alfred A. Knopf 1956) (1835). Modern scholar James G. Wilson
has emphasized the distribution of wealth as shaping the constitution of a state. See, e.g.,
James G. Wilson, Commentary, Noam Chomsky and Judicial Review, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
439,445-48 (1996) (suggestingthat anAristotelian view of'constitution' [would] emphasizeD
actual distributions of wealth and power far more than formal, legal structures'); James G.
Wilson, The Unconstitutionality of Eliminating Estate and Gift Taxes, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
771, 771 (2000) ("The recent proposal to eliminate estate and gift taxes is not only immoral
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De Tocqueville continued, "When framed in a particular manner,
[the law of inheritance] unites, draws together, and vests property
and power in a few hands; it causes an aristocracy, so to speak, to
spring out of the ground."21 Formed on other principles, "it divides,
distributes, and disperses both property and power"-it produces a
democracy.217 So de Tocqueville saw American legislation ending
the monopoly on inheritance enjoyed by the eldest son as a powerful
engine producing democracy. In an age of large families, there was
much to his view.
In his brief passage, Tucker seems to express similar views. If so,
he was concerned not only with protecting wealth from democracy
but also, at least to some extent, with protecting democracy from an
aristocracy of concentrated and inherited wealth. Though the
parcenary law applied only to intestate succession, Tucker thought
that the natural affection of parents for all their children would
ordinarily lead to wills with similar provisions.218 If so, both the
statute and the operation of natural affection could help to limit the
concentration of property in a few hands.
IV. TUCKER ON PUBLIC EDUCATION
Like free speech, education is central to democratic government.
Tucker supported public education. In Tucker's Blackstone's, he
noted a Virginia act that allowed, but did not require, elected
aldermen to provide public education for their districts. 2" The
county court was first to determine whether any election for
aldermen should occur. No election was required. 22' Tucker
commented that the discretion to carry out the act, or not, was
"calculated to defeat it's [sic] execution, in every county where
and a poor allocation of resources, but also is unconstitutional."); James G. Wilson, Why a
Fundamental Right to a Quality Education Is Not Enough, 34 AKRON L. REV. 383, 383-86
(2000) (arguing that popular economic reform must accompany judicially imposed
educational reform).
216. 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 215, at 48.
217. Id.
218. See Tucker, Descents in Virginia, supra note 211, ed. app. at 18.
219. St. George Tucker, Abstract of the Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge
in Virginia, in 2 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, ed. app. at 88
[hereinafter Tucker, Diffusion of Knowledge].
220. Id.
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illiberal and parsimonious magistrates may compose the court; or,
illiberal and parsimonious persons be chosen as alderman."22'
According to Tucker, the provision also showed
an opposition to the act in the legislature, itself, founded upon
the most illiberal, and parsimonious principles, without any
regard to the public good. For it must be evident that the act will
only be carried into execution in those counties, where liberality
of sentiment, and a just estimation of the value of education,
prevail, and not in those, where they are most wanted. 2
Tucker also attributed his emancipation proposal's defeat to narrow
self-interest 23 similar to the narrow and parsimonious self-interest
that he said had hobbled the bill for public education.
V. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER TUCKER'S DEATH
A. The Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829
By 1829, demands for greater democracy produced a Virginia
state constitutional convention.224 There, champions of "conserva-
tive" eastern interests, who represented the areas with the most
slaves, again opposed democratic reform. 22' Like Tucker, they
insisted on representation for property and people.226 Able Upshur,
a delegate from the Eastern Shore, admitted that "[a]s a general
proposition ... in free Governments, power ought to be given to a
majority. 227 Still, democracy "required 'identity of interests' among
members of the political community., 228 But, as Upshur pointed out,
the slaveholding areas of the Commonwealth had a unique interest
in slaves.229 Democratic representation would subject the slavehold-
ers to "peculiar impositions" and "peculiar hazards" from those
221. Id.
222. Id. ed. app. at 88-89.
223. See id. ed. app. at 31-32.
224. See FREEHLING, supra note 6, at 47.
225. See id. at 47-50.
226. See id. at 70-76.
227. Id. at 53 (citing COMMONWEALTHOFVA., PROCEEDINGSANDDEBATESOFTHEVIRGINIA
STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, at 70-71, 74-76).
228. Id.
229. Id.
1188 [Vol. 47:1157
2006] ST. GEORGE TUCKER AND THE LEGACY OF SLAVERY
parts of the commonwealth where slaveholding was rare and
opposition to slavery was extensive.230
In contrast, reformers insisted that giving political power to
property holders tended toward "aristocracy or oligarchy"23' giving
the "few, who are rich, a control over the many who are poor."23
They charged that such laws violated the doctrines of majority rule
and equality, principles set out in Virginia's Declaration of
Rights. 33
The 1829 constitutional convention, dominated by eastern
"conservatives," passed some grudging reforms. But the reforms left
the heavily slaveholding regions in a dominant position.2 34 The new
voting requirements still disfranchised about one-third of the white
population.2 3' The issue between democratic reformers and
"aristocratic conservatives" at the convention was between democ-
racy and slavery.2 36 Indeed, the basic question in Virginia's political
battles between 1829 and 1861 was whether slavery was compatible
with majority rule.23 7
B. Extra Political Power for Slaveholders Helped Defeat a Plan to
End Slavery in Virginia
The danger of slave rebellions was one of the reasons Tucker
favored emancipation. In 1831, Virginia had a horrific rebellion
when Nat Turner and his fellow rebels killed more than fifty white
slaveholders, mostly women and children.238 The Nat Turner
rebellion led to a Virginia legislative debate on ending slavery in
Virginia, which in turn produced a struggle for freedom to criticize
slavery.2
39
230. Id. at 53-54.
231. Id. at 60.
232. Id. at 52 (citing COMMONWEALTHOFVA., PROCEEDINGSANDDEBATESOFTHEVIRGINIA
STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, at 54-62).
233. Id. at 60.
234. See id. at 77-81.
235. Id. at 77.
236. Id. at xii.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 3.
239. See id. at xii.
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Virginia's "aristocratic conservatives" objected to debating the
subject. They considered discussion dangerous and improper. 240 We
debate it-the Press debates it--everybody debates it ... as if the
slaves around us had neither eyes nor ears," complained Represen-
tative James H. Gholson.241 Supporters of debating the issue
invoked basic democratic principles. "The time has passed," said
Representative William Henry Broadnax, "when there can be any
'sealed subject' in this country.... The spirit of the age will not
tolerate suppression.'"242
Though the debate was open and spirited, a proposal to submit
gradual abolition to the voters was narrowly defeated.243 In 1829,
demands for equal political representation based on white voters
had been defeated in the Virginia constitutional convention.244
Opponents of majority rule (by white men) insisted that it would
threaten slavery. 45 In 1831 and 1832, the Virginia Constitution's
undemocratic nature helped do the work that "aristocratic conserva-
tives" had envisioned: protecting slavery from abolition. Those
western areas of the commonwealth, whose representatives most
strongly supported abolition, were the areas that remained
underrepresented.24 s
This point requires qualification, however. Thomas Jefferson's
grandson made one of the main proposals to abolish slavery in the
Virginia legislature in 1831 and 1832.247 It provided for gradual
emancipation, but left open the possibility that slaves could be sold
south before the act's effective date, and it required colonization of
emancipated slaves.248 Even if the legislature had voted for some
240. Id. at 137.
241. Id. (citing RICHMOND ENQUIRER, Jan. 21, 24, 1832).
242. Id. at 140-41 (quoting William H. Brodnax (of Dinwiddie), Policy of the State with
Respect to Its Colored Population, Address Before the House of Delegates of Virginia (1832)).
243. See id. at 192-93.
244. See id. at 193.
245. See id. at 54.
246. See, e.g., id. at 270 (comparing Virginia's white population to the 1829-1830 appor-
tionment of delegates).
247. Id. at 129.
248. See id. at 129-30; see also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael Higginbotham,
"Yearning to Breathe Free" Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in
Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1213, 1230-31 (1993) (noting the efforts of the
American Colonization Society, which was funded by the Virginia Assembly, to colonize freed
slaves in Liberia).
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form of abolition, it is not clear that the slaveholding parts of the
commonwealth would have accepted it. After all, in 1860 the South
seceded rather than face exclusion of slavery from the national
territories. One reason, expressed by Jefferson Davis and others,
was to protect wealth in slaves. 49 It seems unlikely that Virginia's
slaveholding regions would have acquiesced in a far greater
intrusion on slavery in the 1830s. In any case, political arrange-
ments like those favored by Tucker helped ensure that the experi-
ment would not be tried.
As time passed, the grip of slavery tightened. In 1782, Virginia
allowed slave owners-subject to certain qualifications--to free
slaves in their wills or by other written instruments.2" By 1862,
during the Civil War, the Virginia legislature prohibited manumis-
sion altogether.251
C. Later Incarnations of Ideas Raised by Tucker
Tucker wrote in the context of his times. People's views can and
do change with changes in their perception of their interests and
with changes in the social environment. How Tucker would have
responded, for example, to the crisis of southern democracy that
preceded the Civil War, or to Reconstruction, is impossible to know.
Nor can we know whether Tucker would have "refined" his support
for free speech when faced with agitation for immediate abolition.
When Tucker wrote that slavery was inconsistent with democracy,
he was not thinking about southern suppression of antislavery
speech in the face of abolitionists' harsh denunciations of slavery
and slaveholders. Would he have seen the suppression of abolition-
ists as an appropriate exercise of states' rights? After the Civil War
and the post-Civil War Amendments, how would he have viewed
race and Bill of Rights questions? Tucker wrote about states' rights
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, not about the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, or the
Reconstruction Acts.
249. Michael Kent Curtis, John A. Bingham and the Story of American Liberty: The Lost
Cause Meets the "Lost Clause," 36 AKRON L. REv. 617, 619-20 (2003).
250. Higginbotham & Higginbotham, supra note 248, at 1257.
251. Id. at 1268.
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The next section of this Article moves beyond St. George Tucker
to consider briefly the later career of some issues that Tucker
confronted in a very different context. The discussion does not
break new ground. Instead, it seeks to put the issues in a larger and
later context.
1. Slavery and the Suppression of Antislavery Speech
In his Dissertation on Slavery, Tucker wrote that slavery was
incompatible with democracy." 2 Beyond a cryptic citation to the
Virginia Declaration of Rights, Tucker did not elaborate.253 In the
years following Tucker's death, the tension between slavery and
democracy became increasingly stark. Before the Civil War, the
Supreme Court held that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights did
not limit the states." 4 At least at first, a wide consensus existed in
both the North and the South that the regulation of slavery and of
antislavery speech was a state-law matter.255 These facts, plus
vague concepts like licentiousness and bad tendency made suppres-
sion of antislavery speech more palatable. When he wrote about the
Sedition Act, Tucker's states' rights philosophy supported free
speech. But in the years between 1830 and 1860, the right to free
speech and the right of southern states to suppress antislavery
speech were on a collision course.
As the sectional crisis intensified, the southern elite advanced
various reasons to justify suppressing antislavery speech. They
emphasized the danger of slave revolts and the threat of disunion
and civil war. But another interest was undoubtedly at work as
well-protection of slave "property" from the democratic process.
The potential danger of a political attack on slavery was real. In
most southern states, slaveowners were a distinct minority, but
they had countervailing advantages: racism and fear of economic
competition from free blacks.
In 1831 and 1832, after the Nat Turner rebellion, the Virginia
legislature debated and came close to passing a plan to gradually
252. TUCKER, DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY, supra note 9, at 48-49.
253. Id.
254. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 243 (1833).
255. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 42, at 4-7, 10 (discussing the free speech debate from the
Sedition Act of 1798 to the Supreme Court's holding in Barron).
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end slavery in Virginia.256 After their victory in the 1831-1832 battle
over ending slavery in the Virginia legislature, abolition opponents
continued to complain about allowing the subject to be debated. One
conservative aristocrat, writing as "Appomatox," called for a boycott
of Virginia newspapers that discussed the abolition issue.2 5 7 "JLet us
pay no regard," he wrote, "to claims for ... independence of the
press."25 But, as Alison Freehling reports, Appomatox faced
substantial criticism. The 'tone and temper of [the pamphlet], a
'Subscriber,' protested, [was] better suited to the arrogance of a
Dictator than to the equality of a republican citizen."259 Another
writer, under the name Jefferson, asked if Appomatox subscribed
to "'the aristocratic principle' that only rich slaveholders [had] 'any
right to deal with abolition."'26° "Jefferson" insisted that Virginians
should '"read all' house speeches and 'newspaper essays' on 'both
sides."'26' He also urged them to elect representatives who favored
full inquiry.26 2
Although the Virginia debate had been full and open, the tide
began to turn. In Virginia, the "conservative" supporters of slavery
succeeded in tarring advocates of reform as allies to the "fanatical"
abolitionists of the North, who, like William Lloyd Garrison,
favored full equality for blacks.263
As sectional conflict over slavery intensified, free speech on the
subject of slavery began to disappear in the South. Southern states
criminalized speech that tended to incite discontent or insurrection
among slaves or free blacks. The southern elite interpreted the laws
broadly and applied them to people who circulated anti-slavery
literature to whites.264 On the subject of slavery, white voters were
reduced to reading material fit for slaves. The following examples
256. See supra Part V.B.
257. See supra Part V.B.
258. FREEHLING, supra note 6, at 198 (citing APPOMATOX [BENJAMIN WATKINS LEIGH], THE
LETTER OF APPOMATOX TO THE PEOPLE OF VIRGINIA 7, 27-30 (1832)).
259. Id. at 199 (quoting RICHMOND ENQUIRER, Feb. 16, 1832).
260. Id. at 200.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 221.
264. See, e.g., State v. Worth, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 488 (1860); see also CURTIS, supra note 42,
at 295.
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show the extent to which the South became a closed society on the
subject of slavery.
In 1835, an Alabama jury indicted R. G. Williams, the publishing
agent for the abolitionist paper The Emancipator, for an article in
the New York paper. The offending passage was set out in the
indictment: "God commands, and all nature cries out, that man
should not be held as property. The system of making men property,
has plunged 2,250,000 of our fellow countrymen into the deepest
physical and moral degradation, and they are every moment
sinking deeper., 26 ' The criticism of slavery that produced the
Alabama indictment was no stronger than many Tucker had made.
Though the governor of Alabama demanded extradition of Williams
for trial in Alabama on this indictment, the Governor of New York
refused, citing states' rights.
266
Virginia had produced some strong defenders of free speech, as
Tucker's work and Madison's Report of 1800267 for the Virginia
legislature on the Sedition Act illustrate. But the acid of slavery
soon ate away at free speech in Virginia as well:
On March 23, 1836, Virginia passed a comprehensive act aimed
at suppressing anti-slavery agitation.... The law provided a fine
and mandatory imprisonment of "any member of an abolition or
anti-slavery society" who "shall come into this state, and shall
here maintain, by speaking or writing, that the owners of slaves
have no property in the same, or advocate or advise the abolition
of slavery."26
It also criminalized circulating material "with the intent of
persuading persons of colour ... to rebel, or denying the master the
right of property in their slaves, and inculcating the duty of
resistance to such right. 269
The 1836 act required postmasters to notify a justice of the peace
of incendiary documents in the mail; willing recipients were to be
265. CURTIS, supra note 42, at 161 (citing WILLIAM JAY, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS ON
SLAVERY 151 (Negro Univ. Press 1968) (1853)).
266. Id. at 203-04.
267. See James Madison, The Virginia Report of 1799-1800, in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
supra note 164, at 197.
268. CURTIS, supra note 42, at 260-61.
269. Id. at 261.
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prosecuted. The act also required the postmaster to burn such
items. Under this act, in 1859, a Virginia postmaster banned the
New York Tribune, a leading Republican paper.27 ° In North Carolina
in 1850, a Wesleyan minister gave a young white girl a pamphlet
asserting that slavery violated the Ten Commandments. He was
charged with violating the state's incendiary documents statute,
convicted, and sentenced to a year in prison and twenty lashes. The
antislavery preacher escaped these harsh punishments when he
was released as part of an agreement that he leave the state.27'
In 1856, Benjamin Hedrick, a professor of chemistry at the
University of North Carolina, supported James C. Fremont, the
Republican candidate for President. The Raleigh Weekly Standard
"exposed" Hedrick and the university discharged him for the offense
of supporting Fremont. Hedrick returned to his home in Salisbury,
North Carolina, but the threat of mob violence forced him to flee the
state.272
The Weekly Standard crowed about its achievement:
Our object was to rid the University and the State of an avowed
Fremont man; and we succeeded. And we now say, after due
consideration ... that no man who is avowedly for John C.
Fremont for President ought to be allowed to breathe the air or
to tread the soil of North Carolina.273
Hedrick's experience was not an isolated incident. In the Lincoln-
Douglas debates, both Lincoln and Douglas agreed that Republicans
could not campaign in the South.274
After the 1856 presidential election, Hinton Helper, a North
Carolinian, published a searing attack of slavery. Helper's experi-
ence shows again the persistence of issues of wealth, slavery, and
democracy. Helper's book urged non-slaveholders in southern states
to unite to abolish slavery by peaceful political means. But Helper
270. Id. (citing CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOM-OF-THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SOUTH
211-12 (1964)).
271. Id. at 263.
272. Id. at 290-92.
273. Id. at 290 (citing Benjamin Hedrick, Once More, RALEIGH WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 5,
1856, at 1).
274. Id. at 282; see also CREATED EQUAL, THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF
1858, at 290-91 (Paul Angle ed., 1958).
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also advocated fighting back if the "lords of the lash" and their
"cringing lickspittles" used violence to suppress democratic
action."' He pointed out that there were many more non-slavehold-
ers than slaveholders, not counting the slaves who, Helper said, in
nine cases out of ten would be delighted to cut their masters'
throats.276
Helper made a class appeal to non-slaveholding whites, contend-
ing that slavery injured whites. Kenneth Stampp's study of slavery
supports the thesis that slavery harmed white workers. According
to Stampp:.
[White workers found their bargaining power severely re-
stricted as long as employers were able to hire slaves and keep
them at subsistence levels. In 1860, the average annual wage of
textile workers in New England was $205; in the South it was
$145. Even in industries that employed no slaves, the threat to
employ them was always there nonetheless. The replacement of
white labor with slaves after a strike in Richmond's Tredegar
Iron Company was a dramatic illustration of the free worker's
weak position in the South. A low standard of living for Negro
labor meant a low standard of living for white labor too.Y
77
Shortly before the election of 1860, leading Republicans sub-
scribed to a plan to publish an abridged version of Helper's book for
use as a campaign document. 278 A central plank in the platform of
the new Republican Party was opposing slavery in the territories. 9
Helper's thesis was that slavery harmed white workers and small
farmers.2' That thesis was clearly relevant to the national debate
over planting slavery in the territories. Still, the fact that Helper's
book was part of the national debate over slavery did not protect it.
In 1859, Daniel Worth, another North Carolina Wesleyan
minister, was indicted for circulating Helper's book.2 8' Worth was
275. HINTON ROWAN HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH: How TO MEET IT 149
(New York, A.B. Burdick 1860); see CURTIS, supra note 42, at 271-72.
276. HELPER, supra note 275, at 149.
277. KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM
SOUTH 426 (1956).
278. CURTIS, supra note 42, at 272.
279. See id. at 272-77.
280. Id. at 271.
281. Id. at 293-94.
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charged under the North Carolina law that forbade circulating
publications that tended to make slaves discontent.282 For distribut-
ing the Helper book to whites, Reverend Worth was tried, convicted,
and sentenced to prison. 83 Pending his appeal, Worth was released
on bail and fled the state.2s In 1860, the North Carolina General
Assembly amended North Carolina's incendiary documents statute.
The new statute imposed the death penalty for the first offense.285
In congressional debates over Helper's book between 1859 and
1860, Republicans complained that slavery had suppressed free
speech in the South.28" Representative John Bingham of Ohio, the
future author of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, pointed
out that making antislavery speeches like those uttered in the
Virginia abolition debate of 1832 would cost a Virginian his life,
that a mob broke up a Republican meeting in Wheeling, and that a
representative to the Republican national convention in 1856 was
driven from the commonwealth merely because of his attendance. 287
Tucker did not live to see the conflict between slavery and free
speech. But, on the eve of the Civil War, like Tucker many years
before, members of Lincoln's Republican Party asserted that slavery
and democracy were incompatible. They cited repression of
antislavery speech as exhibit one in their case against slavery.2 8
Slavery had silenced political speech on the major issue of the time
in much of the nation. The effect of silencing antislavery speech in
the South was to remove the issue from the political agenda. As a
result, the status of slavery was dealt with in the awful carnage of
the Civil War, not in southern politics.
In 1864, congressional Republicans debated a constitutional
amendment to outlaw slavery. Several pointed to slavery's suppres-
sion of free speech and other liberties fundamental to a democratic
society.289 Congressman James Wilson of Iowa, the chairman of the
282. Id. at 293.
283. Id. at 294.
284. Id. at 294-95.
285. 1860-1861 N.C. Sess. Laws 39; see also CURTIS, supra note 42, at 295-96.
286. CURTIS, supra note 42, at 271-88 (discussing the congressional debate over Helper's
book).
287. Curtis, supra note 249, at 640.
288. CURTIS, supra note 42, at 281-88, 362-63.
289. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 37-39, 52 (1986). For earlier Republican complaints
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Judiciary Committee in the 38th Congress, made one of the most
comprehensive statements.290 Wilson quoted the Constitution's
Supremacy Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2. He continued:
With these rights no State may interfere without breach of the
bond which holds the Union together. How have these rights
essential to liberty been respected in those sections of the Union
where slavery held the reins of local authority and directed the
thoughts, prejudices, and passions of the people? The bitter,
cruel, relentless persecutions of the Methodists in the South,
almost as void of pity as those which visited upon the Huguenots
in France, tell how utterly slavery disregards the right to a free
exercise of religion....
How much better has free discussion fared at the hands of the
black censor who guards the interests of slavery against the
expression of the thoughts of freemen? On what rood of this
Republic cursed by slavery have men been free to declare their
approval of the divine doctrines of the Declaration of Independ-
ence? ... The press has been padlocked, and men's lips have been
sealed. Constitutional defense of free discussion by speech or
press has been a rope of sand south of the line which marked the
limit of dignified free labor in this country. South of that line an
organized element of death was surely sapping the foundations
of our free institutions, reversing the theory of our Government,
dwarfing our civilization, contracting the national conscience,
compassing the destruction of everything calculated to preserve
the republican character of our Constitution; and no man in the
immediate presence of this rapidly accumulating ruin dared to
raise a voice of warning. Submission and silence were inexorably
exacted. Such, sir, is the free discussion which slavery tolerates.
Such is its observance of the high constitutional rights of the
citizen. Its past will be repeated in its future if the people permit
it to curse the world with a continued existence.
'The right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances," has been as
completely disregarded as the other rights I have mentioned by
the terrorism which guards the citadel of slavery. If slavery
persecuted religionists, denied the privilege of free discussion,
about slavery's suppression of free speech, see CURTIS, supra note 42, at 281-88.
290. CURTIS, supra note 289, at 37.
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prevented free elections, trampled upon all of the constitutional
guarantees belonging to the citizen, peaceable assemblages of
the people to consider these grievances with a view to petition
the Government for redress could not be held .... Throughout all
the dominions of slavery, republican government, constitutional
liberty, the blessings of our free institutions were mere fables.
An aristocracy enjoyed unlimited power, while the people were
pressed to the earth and denied the inestimable privileges which
by right they should have enjoyed in all the fullness designed by
the Constitution.
Sir, I might enumerate many other constitutional rights of
the citizen which slavery has disregarded and practically
destroyed, but I have enough to illustrate my proposition: that
slavery disregards the supremacy of the Constitution and denies
to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States....
[Tihe people of the free States should insist on ample protec-
tion to their rights, privileges, and immunities, which are none
other than those which the Constitution was designed to secure
to all citizens alike, and see to it that the power which caused
the war shall cease to exist .... An equal and exact observance of
the constitutional rights of each and every citizen, in each and
every State, is the end to which we should cause the lessons of
this war to carry us. Whatever stands between us and the
accomplishment of this great end should be removed. Can we
reach this end and save slavery? ... Can we mix the oil and
water of despotism and republicanism? ... What, then, shall we
do? Abolish slavery. How? By amending our national Constitu-
tion. Why? Because slavery is incompatible with free govern-
ment.29 1
The problems of establishing free speech in a multiracial
democracy did not end with the Civil War and Reconstruction. The
defeat of Reconstruction, the suppression of effective political
dissent, the disfranchisement of southern blacks and the mainte-
nance of a racial caste system continued in much of the South until
the 1960s.
291. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202-03 (1864).
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2. The Black Codes
St. George Tucker saw a black code that discriminated against
blacks as essential to achieve emancipation and in some respects,
at least, as necessary to the regulation of the newly freed slaves.
After the Civil War, leaders in southern states confronted immedi-
ate emancipation. Though the southern states had ratified the
Thirteenth Amendment, they soon passed black codes to deal with
the status of the newly freed slaves.
The southern states' black codes were similar though more
extreme than the one Tucker proposed. The codes denied blacks
many basic rights. For example, one Louisiana parish forbade a
Negro from passing within the limits of the parish without a permit
from his employer, prohibited Negroes from renting or keeping a
house within the parish, required Negroes to be in the regular
service of some white person or former owner, denied Negroes the
right to hold meetings after sunset or at any time without special
permission of the captain of patrol, forbade Negroes from preaching
or declaiming to congregations of colored people without special
permission in writing from the president of the police jury, prohib-
ited Negroes from carrying firearms without special permission
unless they were Union soldiers, and banned Negroes from selling,
bartering, or exchanging merchandise without an employer's special
written permission.292 Violators were to be fined or put in a barrel
for twelve hours.29 Southern black codes also typically prohibited
blacks from testifying against whites, owning real estate, and
entering contracts.294
Congressional Republicans were outraged at the black codes,
which they saw as an attempt to revive slavery under another
name. They thought that such laws violated the Thirteenth
Amendment. In response, they proposed the Civil Rights Bill of
1866.295 It provided that blacks were U.S. citizens and should enjoy
292. 1 WALTER L. FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORYOFRECONSTRUCTION 279-81 (1906).
The Board of Police of Opelousas, Louisiana adopted a similar ordinance. See CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 516-17 (1866) (reproducing the ordinance in the speech of
Representative Thomas Eliot of Massachusetts).
293. 1 FLEMING, supra note 292, at 281.
294. Id.
295. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31 Stat. 27.
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the same rights as whites to own property, contract, testify, file
court actions, and enjoy the full and equal benefit of all laws and
provisions for the security of person and property as enjoyed by
white citizens. 9 The act was national in scope.297 It and the
Fourteenth Amendment were designed to root out discrimination
against blacks in such basic rights, not only in the South, but also
in any Northern states where such discrimination persisted.
Republicans claimed that ample constitutional power existed
to pass the bill. They cited the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on
slavery, the congressional power to enforce the Amendment, and
other constitutional provisions.298 As leading Republicans ex-
plained, the discriminations against blacks in the black codes were
badges and incidents of slavery which Congress had the power to
extirpate. s9
Democratic critics in Congress insisted that the power to outlaw
slavery did not include the power to prohibit discriminations, such
as those in the black codes.3" They pointed out that some free
states that prohibited slavery enforced discriminatory laws.3 °1
No one cited St. George Tucker in the congressional debates over
the black codes, the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, or the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Even if the congressmen were familiar
with Tucker's Dissertation on Slavery, it is not hard to see why:
Tucker would not have suited either faction. His concept of civil
slavery could have been used to support the claim that the black
codes were a form of slavery. Tucker recognized that discrimina-
tions like those that later appeared in the black codes were a form
of slavery. Tucker also recognized that such discrimination sprang
from slavery. To that extent, his views provided support for the
Republican claim that such laws were badges of slavery that
Congress could outlaw under the Thirteenth Amendment. But
Tucker also supported a harsh black code of his own. His dire
296. Id.
297. See id.
298. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, 322, 941-42 (1866) (reporting
Senator Trumbull's speech about congressional power to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment).
299. Id.
300. See, e.g., id. at 628 (reporting a speech by Representative Samuel Marshall); CURTIS,
supra note 289, at 81.
301. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 628 (1866).
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predictions about the behavior of newly free blacks would hardly
have been helpful to Republicans in the 39th Congress. Nor would
his states' rights jurisprudence have helped Republicans. On the
other hand, his statements that black codes were a form of slavery
would hardly have helped Democratic opponents of the Civil Rights
Bill.
The Supreme Court did not interpret the Thirteenth Amendment
as providing broad congressional power to reach private racial
discrimination in contractual relations until the 1960s in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. 302 The majority and the dissent cited state-
ments by congressmen in the 39th Congress, not St. George
Tucker. °3
3. States'Rights, Slavery, and the Rights of Blacks
Though Tucker opposed slavery, he embraced a strict construc-
tion/states' rights understanding of the Constitution. In 1799,
Tucker invoked states' rights to protect the rights of aliens and the
right of free speech from oppressive federal action.3 °4 In his Letter
to a Member of Congress, Tucker cited the Tenth Amendment and
wrote that "every power which was carved out of the sovereignty of
the states ... is to be construed strictly, wherever it may derogate
from any power reserved to the states by the federal constitu-
tion."3 5 Although he hoped the Virginia government would act
against slavery, Tucker's constitutional philosophy protected the
institution from the federal government. Tucker was hardly alone
in this view. In the pre-Civil War period, most abolitionists and
Republicans accepted the principle that slavery in the states was
beyond the federal government's power.
Tucker wrote before the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments. But it is clear how the states' rights
philosophy to which Tucker made important contributions func-
tioned in the period between the Civil War and the second recon-
struction of the 1960s.
302. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-40 (1968).
303. Id. at 440; id. at 455-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
304. See TUCKER, LETTER TO A MEMBER OF CONGRESS, supra note 119, at 3.
305. Id.
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Throughout this period of American history, the "right" of
southern states to regulate blacks blocked steps toward racial
equality. In the South, almost every victory over slavery and its
legacy involved expansive use of national power. Examples include
the Emancipation Proclamation;3° the Thirteenth Amendment,
ratified in 1865;307 the Civil Rights Act of 1866;30s the Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1868;309 the Reconstruction Acts, which
enfranchised black men in the South;310 the Fifteenth Amendment,
ratified in 1870;311 the Civil Rights Acts passed in response to Ku
Klux Klan violence in the South;312 the public accommodations Civil
Rights Act of 1875;313 the Civil Rights Act of 1964;314 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. 3'5
Supreme Court decisions that embraced a limited view of
national power and a broad view of states' rights hobbled or
nullified many of these acts and amendments.316 Only in the 1960s,
with expansive applications of national power and supportive
Supreme Court decisions from the Warren Court, did the nation
begin a comprehensive effort to dismantle the racial caste system.
317
306. Abraham Lincoln, The Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), available at
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured-documentslemancipation-proclamationtranscript.
html.
307. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
308. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
309. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
310. Act of Dec. 22, 1869, ch. 3, 16 Stat. 59; Act of Mar. 11, 1868, ch. 25, 15 Stat. 41; Act
of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14; Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2; Act of Mar. 2,
1867, ch. 152, 14 Stat. 428.
311. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
312. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433; Act
of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
313. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
314. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000).
315. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
316. E.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23-26 (1883) (limiting congressional
enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment and adopting a narrow reading of the
Thirteenth Amendment); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 644 (1883) (striking down
a Reconstruction statute as beyond congressional power); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 553-54 (1876) (reading the rights of American citizens that Congress could protect
narrowly and limiting enforcement to state action, thereby shielding terrorist groups like the
Klan from federal criminal prosecution for conspiracies to deprive citizens of rights such as
those in the Bill of Rights); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75-78 (1873)
(establishing a narrow reading of the "privileges and immunities" of citizens of the United
States, thereby undermining Reconstruction statutes).
317. E.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (upholding the Voting
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An oligarchic-and often racist-localism that embraced states' rights
fought a bitter rear guard action against these advances.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Tucker on Slavery
St. George Tucker recognized the profound evil of chattel slavery.
In his Dissertation on Slavery, he never denied or minimized the
evil. He repeatedly said slavery was inconsistent with the American
Revolution's ideals of liberty and equality. Tucker also saw that
discriminations suffered by free blacks were a form of slavery.
To rid Virginia of slavery and also of blacks, however, Tucker was
willing to endorse laws that harshly discriminated against free
blacks. He felt that these brutal provisions were a necessary
concession to prejudice. At least as an initial matter, he was
unwilling to accept blacks as equal fellow citizens. That might be
possible at some future date, he suggested, if race prejudice
subsided. Tucker faced the dilemma of the practical reformer. A
harsh black code would hardly be conducive to reducing prejudice.
But without it, Tucker feared, emancipation would not be possible
or practical. Still, Tucker refused to endorse mandatory deportation
of freed slaves. That made him more liberal than some leading
proponents of the 1830-1831 plan to end slavery in Virginia.
In part, Tucker's discriminatory plans for free blacks in Virginia
may have been strategic concessions to racial prejudice. Strategy is
suggested by the tension between his denunciations of prejudice
and his proclamations of the humanity of slaves and the brother-
hood of men on one hand and his black code on the other. It is also
suggested by Tucker's frank admission in his treatise that he was
Rights Act of 1965); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-05 (1964) (sustaining the
prohibition on racial discrimination in restaurants covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964) (upholding the power
of Congress to prohibit racial discrimination by motels); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
494-95 (1954) (declaring segregated public schools unconstitutional). The trend began earlier.
See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1948) (refusing to allow enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665-66 (1944) (striking down
whites-only primary elections). The attack on the racial caste system really began to take
hold when Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court were all moving strongly in the
same direction.
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making concessions to prejudice. But in the end, unlike some
Virginians, Tucker did not free his slaves. He vetoed a proposal to
free his slaves in his will, fearing that such a provision would give
them an incentive to poison him.31s
One needs to understand Tucker's views on slavery in the broad
context of his time. Few Virginians shared the progressive views of
Robert Pleasants. Tucker's expressed unwillingness to accept blacks
as equals was even shared by Abraham Lincoln before the Civil
War. In his 1854 Peoria, Illinois, speech on the Kansas-Nebraska
Act, Lincoln admitted that he did not know what to do about
slavery in the southern states.319 His first impulse was to send freed
slaves to Liberia, but he recognized problems with that solution. 2
What then? Free them all, and keep them among us as under-
lings? Is it quite certain that this betters their condition? ...
What next? Free them and make them politically and socially,
our equals? My own feelings will not admit of this; and if mine
would, we well know that those of the great mass of white
people will not. Whether this feeling accords with justice and
sound judgment, is not the sole question, if indeed, it is any part
of it. A universal feeling, whether well or ill-founded, cannot be
safely disregarded. We cannot then make them equals.
32 1
Lincoln later made substantial strides on the issue of black
equality, but his views in the 1850s help put those of Tucker in a
larger context.
B. Tucker on Free Speech
Tucker made a substantial contribution during the debates over
the Sedition Act by reviewing and popularizing arguments for
freedom of speech in a democracy. Tucker's Blackstone set out these
arguments for lawyers and students of the law. Tucker recognized
the polar star by which we should navigate free speech controver-
318. Doyle, supra note 3, at 308 n.215 (citation omitted).
319. Abraham Lincoln, Kansas-Nebraska Act, Address at Peoria, Illinois (Oct. 16, 1854),
in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 316 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed.,
1989).
320. Id.
321. Id.
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sies on political matters: the American idea that the people are
sovereign. Presidents, congressmen, governors, and state legislators
are, Tucker believed, merely "servants" who temporarily exercise
power. Loyalty to the nation, as Tucker saw, must not be confused
with loyalty to a particular administration or to its policies. As
Tucker understood, broad protection for free speech is essential to
democracy because without free speech the people cannot consider
and evaluate alternatives. We cannot know what we might want
the law to be unless we can consider and discuss alternatives.
Once Jeffersonians were in power, they began smarting under
what they saw as Federalist misrepresentations and lies. At this
later time, Tucker may have read the role for state law of defama-
tion more broadly. If so, his later reading of broad state power is in
serious tension with his descriptions of free speech in democratic
government.
If an inconsistency exists here, it is an old one. Cato's Letters
were a series of essays on liberty that were widely circulated in the
colonies and the United States both before and after the Revolution.
Speaking of free speech, Cato observed:
This liberty has been approved or condemned by all men, and all
parties, in proportion as were advantaged or annoyed by it.
When they were in power, they were unwilling to have their
actions scanned and censured, and cried out, that such licence
ought not to be borne and tolerated in any well-constituted
commonwealth; and when they suffered under the weight of
power, they thought it very hard not to be allowed the liberty to
utter their groans .322
But, of course, in his concern with the corrosive effects of falsehoods
in a democratic nation, Tucker has a point that is clear to an
observer of the modern world: pervasive and effective falsehoods
can undermine democracy.
Madison recognized the problem but thought the cure was worse
than the disease.32 3 Some later nineteenth-century writers also
322. 2 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO'S LETTERS 713 (Ronald Hamowy ed.,
Liberty Fund 1995) (1722).
323. James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (Jan. 7, 1800), in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 647 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
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recognized the danger of abuse of press power. Their answer was
that the press is fragmented into many small segments, and these
many fragments of press power checked each other. 24 In light of the
pervasive power of radio, television, and consolidated media
companies, this answer may be less reassuring today.
C. Wealth and Democracy
Tucker apparently saw no contradiction between his values of
liberty, democracy, and education and his insistence on protecting
wealth in land and slaves from democracy. Perhaps, however, we
should not be too critical of Tucker on this score. For one thing, at
least until the 1830s, a number of more conservative American
political leaders embraced to some extent the idea that wealth
deserved extra representation in the legislature. 2 Though his
particular way of protecting concentrated wealth from democracy
has been repudiated, the problem is still with us. 2
6
Tucker failed to understand how concentrated wealth in slaves
produced a powerful economic interest that was in many ways
hostile to democracy. Indeed, he believed that government should
be structured to protect such wealth. Fairly simple reforms such as
"one white man, one vote" would have enhanced democracy, though
not necessarily liberty. But Tucker was unwilling to contemplate
such reforms because of his fear that they threatened the rights of
wealth. Though we have different antidemocratic systems than
324. THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 557 (Lawbook Exch.,
5th ed. 1998) (1883); FREDERICKGRIMKE, CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE NATURE AND TENDENCY
OF FREE INSTITUTIONS 396-403 (John William Ward ed., 1968); 2 THE WORKS OF WILLIAM H.
SEWARD 37 (George E. Baker ed., 1972) (1853). For a discussion of the views of Cooley,
Grimke, and Seward, see Michael Kent Curtis, Democratic Ideals and Media Realities: A
Puzzling Free Press Paradox, 21 J. SOC. PHIL. & POLy 385, 398-403 (2004). See also Michael
Kent Curtis, Judicial Review and Populism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 313, 358-66 (2003).
325. See, e.g., Daniel Webster, Apportionment of the Senate, Address Before the
Massachusetts State Convention of 1820-1821, in POLITICAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA, supra
note 203, at 201-03.
326. See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 322 (2000) (noting the enormous role of money in politics
and how it often forces politicians to cater to the wealthy so they can get crucial funds for
television advertisements).
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those Tucker embraced,32 ' our modern systems also function to
check democracy and to empower concentrated wealth. In light of
our own shortcomings, we should not be too critical of Tucker.
D. Public Education
St. George Tucker understood the importance of public education.
Proponents of democracy have long recognized the crucial function
of education; an educated populace is in a far better position to
understand and debate public issues and to contribute to charting
the nation's course.
James Madison recognized the connection between public
education and republican government. In 1822, Madison wrote to
a correspondent in Kentucky and praised
[t]he liberal appropriations made by the Legislature of Kentucky
for a general system of Education.... A popular Government,
without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but
a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.... [A]
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm them-
selves with the power which knowledge gives.328
Madison believed that public education is essential for meaning-
ful democracy. If so, slavery seems to have blighted democracy.
Slave-state governments typically failed to provide public educa-
tion, while the North and Midwest provided common schools
and tax support for education. All but one of the states that
joined the Confederacy rejected common schools in the years
before the Civil War. 29 These southern states rejected tax support
for schools for white children and made teaching slaves to read a
crime. "Legislative votes in Virginia and Georgia show that
regions least dependent on slavery were the most inclined to
327. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE MARKET SYSTEM: WHAT IT Is, How IT WORKS, AND
WHAT TO MAKE OF IT 236-39 (2002) (discussing the enormous and undemocratic effect of
corporate power).
328. Letter from James Madison to William T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in JAMES MADISON:
WRITINGS, supra note 323, at 790.
329. PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS 108 (2004).
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support common schools ........o Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee,
Arkansas, and Texas-states that by the 1830s accepted universal
(white) male suffrage and legislative apportionment based on the
white population331-also failed to provide public education. Public
education was finally established in the South during Reconstruc-
tion.332
In 1850, twenty percent of adult whites in the South were
illiterate, compared with three percent in the mid-Atlantic states
and less than one percent in New England.333 Newspaper circula-
tion in the South was one-fifth of what it was in New England and
the mid-Atlantic states.334 Though Tucker supported Jefferson's
proposal for public education, 3 5 the existence of extra political
power for the commonwealth's slaveholding areas, an arrangement
Tucker supported, may have helped to doom taxpayer support for
education in Virginia as well. In any case, slavery seems to have
produced an elitist perspective that did little to promote the welfare
of ordinary whites.
CONCLUSION
Today, we still struggle with the meaning of our past and with
issues of race and slavery. For example, in 2004, voters in Alabama
rejected an amendment to delete the Alabama Constitution's
prohibition of integrated schools.13' The amendment, like constitu-
tional provisions in other states, would have also mandated free
330. Id.
331. Sydnor, supra note 176, at 284.
332. See FONER, supra note 44, at 366.
333. STARR, supra note 329, at 108.
334. Id.
335. See Tucker, Diffusion of Knowledge, supra note 219, ed. app. at 86-89; Robert Morton
Scott, St. George Tucker and the Development of American Culture in Early Federal
Virginia, 1790-1824, at 121 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington
University), microformed on UMI No. 9118515 (Univ. Microforms Int'l).
336. Jannell McGrew, Black Caucus May Filibuster Bills, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER
(Ala.), Dec. 17, 2004, at C3 (discussing the voters' defeat of a constitutional amendment that
sought to remove racist language mandating segregation in schools). The head of the
Alabama's Christian Coalition warned of frivolous lawsuits if the state constitution
guaranteed public education. Id. The Black Caucus in the Alabama legislature threatened
to filibuster against a proposal to submit a version of the amendment without the education
provision. Id.
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public education.337 The amendment's critics charged that such a
provision might result in tax increases.33
The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History,339 assisted by
"plugs from Fox news and other conservative media, "is a New York
Times bestseller.340 The book depicts a Confederate soldier on the
cover. The author criticizes the Supreme Court's school desegrega-
tion decision in Brown v. Board of Education as unlawful, has kind
words to say about state nullification of federal laws,34' and argues
that the Fourteenth Amendment was never constitutionally
ratified.342 Even if it were, the author suggests it should not protect
the First Amendment liberties against actions by the states. The
author also suggests that the black codes passed by southern
legislatures after the Civil War were hardly different from northern
laws against vagrancy and other provisions in northern states.343
The controversy over slavery and how it should be taught is not
settled either. In December 2004, the Raleigh News and Observer
reported that the Cary Christian School, "one of the area's largest
Christian schools," had assigned the forty-three page book Southern
Slavery, As It Was to its ninth-grade students.344 The book said it "is
strange that the thing the Bible condemns (slave-trading) brings
little opprobrium upon the North, yet that which the Bible allows
(slave-ownership) has brought down all manner of condemnation on
the South. 345 While admitting that slavery was not perfect, the
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. THOMAS WOODS, JR., THE POLITICALLY INCORRECT GUIDE TO AMERICAN HISTORY
(2004).
340. Adam Cohen, The Difference Between Politically Incorrect and Historically Wrong,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2005, at A16.
341. Id.; see WOODS, supra note 339, at 20-23, 40-42, 86-88, 196-97.
342. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment bars state
discrimination based on race and gender and requires state governments to obey most of the
guarantees in the Constitution's Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
147-48 (1968).
343. WOODS, supra note 339, at 80-84. Although some Northern states had laws that
discriminated against blacks, the implication that Northern laws mirrored the Black Codes
is grossly misleading. At any rate, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was national in scope and
preempted all such laws.
344. T. Keung Hui, School Defends Slavery Booklet, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Dec. 9, 2004, at Bi.
345. Id. (quoting DOUGLAS WILSON & STEVE WILKINS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY, AS IT WAS 22
(1996)).
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authors asserted that it "was a relationship based on mutual
affection and confidence."34 Indeed, according to the book, slaves
enjoyed "a life of plenty, of simple pleasures, of food, clothes, and
good medical care." 47
A school official said that the school was using the book's twenty-
first-century historical assessment to balance the picture of slavery
in Harriet Beecher Stowe's 1852 bestseller, Uncle Tom's Cabin,
which students also read. 48 He explained that his school presented
a balanced picture, in contrast to the one-sided indoctrination
provided in the public schools.349 As this short summary shows,
struggles over slavery and its legacy continue.
St. George Tucker recognized and rejected the evil of slavery. He
provided a powerful and insightful discussion of the relation of free
speech to democratic government. He also recognized that opposi-
tion to those temporarily elected to office and their policies must not
be confused with opposition to government.
Tucker's declarations of principle are accompanied by applica-
tions that are distressing. He embraced a harsh black code for
newly freed slaves. His concern for protecting wealth against
democracy led him to accept political arrangements that further
entrenched slavery, and slavery undermined democracy, even for
white people. He was, in short, a man who reflected some of the
contradictions of the time and place in which he lived.
Tucker's wealth and social standing were intertwined with the
powerful institution of slavery. Though he spoke movingly against
the evil of slavery, he also lived with slavery and accommodated it.
In accommodating evils entwined with his life, Tucker is, perhaps,
not so different from most of us today.
Tucker had some wise and important things to say about slavery,
racial prejudice, democracy, and free speech. Since the legacy of
346. Id. (quoting WILSON & WILKINS, supra note 345, at 24).
347. Id. (quoting WILSON & WILKINS, supra note 345, at 25). For a selection giving the
perspectives of slaves, see, for example, the narratives of former slaves in STEPHEN B.
PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAw AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000). See
generally EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1972)
(exploring the divergent perspectives of masters and slaves).
348. Hui, supra note 344.
349. Id. Though school leaders later dropped the book because they said they had learned
about "faulty footnotes and citation errors," one of the book's authors is scheduled to speak
at the school's graduation. Id.
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slavery persists, understanding slavery and race remains impor-
tant. St. George Tucker is part of that story. Tucker's discussions
of free speech and the idea of a loyal opposition will always be
relevant, especially in times of crisis, when opposition to govern-
ment policy is apt to be confused with disloyalty to the nation.
